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All countries in transition experienced increases in inequality. They have also 
undertaken massive privatization of key asset housing, often on give-away terms. Are 
these two phenomena related? Has transfer of ownership rights to residents slowed 
down the inequality increases or it pushed it up? Surprisingly little is known in this area. 
This paper attempts to provide empirical evidence to start answering these questions. It 
shows how housing privatization affected the distribution of personal wealth and 
inequality in current consumption based on recent representative household surveys 
from three transition countries: Poland, Russia and Serbia. Survey data are compared 
with figures derived from national accounts and housing statistics. Contrary to common 
belief and some earlier evidence of strong equalizing effect of housing distribution in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the paper finds that the contribution of 
housing to the overall inequality levels is not strong, and is not universally progressive. 
There is also a significant variation across countries. In Russia and Serbia …/ 
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progressive. There is also a significant variation across countries. In Russia and Serbia 
features of privatization programmes resulted in better off households capturing more 
valuable housing assets on extremely beneficial terms, while in Poland privatization and 
housing reform led to more equitable outcomes. When owner occupied housing rents 
and durables are properly accounted for, the effects of housing ownership on inequality 
in current consumption are mildly progressive in Russia and Poland and regressive in 
Serbia. The paper argues that the information collected by regular household surveys 
provides only a starting point to study housing wealth distribution, and there are a 
number of gaps which should be addressed through improved data collection. 
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1 Introduction 
There is a growing recognition of the importance of studying wealth distribution 
globally, as well as in developing and transition economies (Davies and Shorrocks 
2005). Understanding the distribution of wealth is important on its own right as an 
indicator of social cohesion. The stock of available assets also determines the ability of 
households to withstand shocks, and inequality in its distribution is linked to inter-
generational transmission of poverty. Even in rich countries with diversified portfolios, 
housing represents the largest part of household wealth. From analysis of the balance 
sheets of a number of rich countries one can infer that housing accounts for an average 
of 35 to 45 per cent of total household wealth. In developing countries housing accounts 
for similarly large share (see Davies and Shorrocks 2005 for a review; Aron et al. 2006 
for South Africa; Li and Zhao 2006 for China; Subramanian and Jayaraj 2006 for India). 
 
Distribution of housing is typically determined by institutional factors and changes 
relatively slowly (see Muellbauer 2006 for a review). Rapid shifts in the distribution of 
property titles are therefore of particular interest to researchers. Land reforms represent 
one type for such a change (see Torche and Spilerman 2006). Massive privatization 
programmes, which all transition economies undertook, form another type and studying 
their outcomes may help to gain insights about how redistribution policies affect 
inequality. During 1991-99 as much as 28 per cent of housing stock in transition 
countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (FSU) was privatized. This 
figure ranged from 7 per cent in Georgia, to over 60 per cent in Estonia and Kazakhstan. 
Privatization of housing was part of a much broader programme which affected the 
distribution of productive assets and the functioning of economy as a whole, again with 
important cross-country differences.  
 
The sheer size of asset value affected by housing privatization appears to be extremely 
large. An influential report of the World Bank (2001) estimated a total wealth transfer 
due to housing privatization across all European and Central Asian (ECA) countries to 
equal as much as US$1.1 trillion, which is equivalent to roughly US$3,300 per capita 
transfer of wealth.1 
 
                                                 
1 The estimate derived in World Bank (2001) is based on opportunity cost approach. It uses assumptions 
about how much people are willing to pay for their housing using the relationship between the housing 
value and their incomes. It takes the conservative estimate of 3.5:1 as the house price to annual income 
ratio (average privatized dwelling unit price is estimated thus at US$22,564). Using average family size in 
these countries of 2.2 the study found family income by multiplying weighted GDP per capita in 1999 by 
2.2. Then, using the assumed income to value of housing ratio, they calculated house value per household. 
To get housing value transferred during privatization, they multiplied the number of households in the 
region, house value per household and weighted percentage of housing privatized between 1991-99 (28 
per cent).   2
These are large values, but little is known about effects of this process on inequality in 
housing wealth distribution in transition economies. To illustrate this, it is sufficient to 
mention that to the best of the author’s knowledge not a single transition economy is 
included in the Luxembourg Wealth Study and no data on Gini index for housing values 
is available for ECA. Moreover, inequality measurement in transition economies is 
plagued by little attention to the issue of owner-occupied housing—as a rule no imputed 
rents are included in the official measurement of income or consumption through 
representative household surveys, and even when they are there is no consistency of 
treatment across countries. Even less data is available on how housing wealth inequality 
compares to other countries and the effects it has on the distribution of incomes (or 
consumption). We do not know in any systematic way how the indices of income 
inequality in transition economies will look like when service flow from owner-
occupied housing is properly taken into account.  
 
Based on the survey data in three transition countries—Poland, Russia, and Serbia—this 
paper attempts to provide empirical evidence about the distribution of housing stock as 
economic asset in transition economies, its relative role compared to other forms of 
wealth holding, and its effects on the distribution of current consumption.2 Three 
countries selected for this paper pursued different types of privatization programmes 
and were characterized by different initial conditions. The spectacular development of 
housing and rental markets in transition economies makes such measurement possible 
and helps to provide plausible and meaningful economic values for asset prices—
something that was totally out of the question in early transition. Survey data are 
compared with figures derived from national accounts and housing statistics. There are 
increasing policy demands to better understand housing distribution. Transition 
economies are engaged in housing policy reform which requires better data. In another 
part of the transition world China is undertaking profound reforms in the housing sector 
amidst rapidly raising inequality and policy lessons from housing privatization in ECA 
may be useful. 
 
The paper is organized into six sections. Section 2 expands the background by 
reviewing housing privatization programmes in transition economies, and aggregate 
data on distribution of housing stock by ownership during the transition in the countries 
of Eastern Europe, and the FSU. Section 3 examines broad measurement issues for 
housing assets valuation and discusses expected impact of privatization on inequality. 
                                                 
2 The paper does not discuss land reforms. Land privatization was an important reform in many transition 
economies redistributing vital asset in the low-income Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
countries, with significant variation across countries. As much as 90 per cent of arable land was 
transferred to households on highly beneficial terms in Albania and Armenia, between one-half and three-
quarters in Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Moldova, one third in Kyrgyzstan and Georgia, but only 10-20 
per cent in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan (Rozelle and Swinnen 2004). Despite initial fears 
of potential regressive effects (Flemming and Micklewright 1999) restitution of land to former owners 
was not shown empirically to have a sizeable effect on inequality (Macours and Swinnen 2005).    3
Section 4 presents survey data used in the study for the three countries in our analysis: 
Poland, Russia, and Serbia. It discusses in some depth the results of multiple 
experiments in valuing housing and other household assets in Serbia conducted over 
2002-03. Section 5 presents the findings. Section 6 concludes with a discussion putting 
the new figures on distributional effects of housing privatization in the context of the 
available literature, points to the policy implications, and identifies gaps to be addressed 
in future research.  
2  Housing ownership in transition economies 
Transition countries in Eastern Europe and FSU began housing reform by privatizing 
housing, generally by simple give-away schemes (most frequently by selling housing 
units at prices well below market valuations). Privatization was accompanied by series 
of reforms aimed at creating institutions for housing markets and often by encouraging 
homeownership. The housing sectors as a whole moved closer to a market system with 
elimination of subsidies for utilities, emergence of private finance and land markets. 
The result of these combined trends is presented on Figure 1.  
Figure 1: privatization outcomes by 1999: share of housing in private hands 
Source: World Bank (2001). 
 
Figure 1 presents data on the change in private ownership for housing assets over 1991-
99 for 17 transition countries. The figure shows the share of housing in private hands 
(measured by square meters of living space) at the start of transition and by 1999. The 
scale of ownership transfer is massive in some countries (Estonia, Latvia, Kazakhstan), 
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moving from public to private homeownership. Although most privatization 
programmes were essentially give-away schemes, in many countries, notably Russia 
and Belarus, a substantial portion of the stock continues to remain in public hands. The 
figure also demonstrates that many countries had a substantial private housing stock in 
1990, at the beginning of transition, but for different reasons. In Hungary, Slovenia and 
Serbia private housing ownership in urban areas was a frequent phenomenon even 
during the socialist era. In Moldova, Bulgaria, Romania, Tajikistan, and Azerbaijan the 
relatively large share of housing in private ownership was a reflection of low 
urbanization rates. Rural areas, even under socialism, largely preserved private 
ownership on housing (but not on the land on which they were built). But in some 
countries large agricultural enterprises built multi-story apartment buildings in rural 
areas hence creating ‘urbanized’ housing publicly owned structures amidst traditional 
rural landscape. Unlike in China’s transition, rural population therefore was not totally 
excluded from housing privatization programmes in Eastern Europe and the FSU.  In 
urban areas too, housing was heterogeneous. Some families lived in privately owned 
single-family houses, which commonly lacked access to basic infrastructure services 
and were of lower quality. Co-operative housing, which required some self-financing, 
was inhabited by somewhat higher earners.  
 
Figure 1 suggests that by early 2000 most transition countries had converted to rather 
high ownership rates (above 80 percent) when compared to 50-60 per cent as typically 
observed in developed market economies. This is a puzzling outcome—Figure 2 
provides evidence why this is the case. The idea behind Figure 2 is that multi-family 
(MF) structures are more efficiently managed by large private companies which 
typically rent out individual units to tenants. Thus the higher the share of MF buildings 
in the housing stock, the larger the share of non-owner tenants than one would expect. 
Large residential buildings and structures inherited from the past—often representing an 
encapsulated ‘soviet’ life style—are still standing in major cities across the region 
giving a vivid reminder of their common history. Indeed, for market economies this 
relationship holds true, as Figure 2 suggests (with Spain being an outlier). In transition 
economies (with exception of the Czech Republic) this relationship shifts significantly 
with too many owners for the physical characteristics of their stock.  
 
This picture suggests that privatization has not produced yet an efficient market. 
Scholars studying housing markets point out that often changes in supporting legislation 
(governing land markets and financial sector) lagged behind ownership reforms, and 
there were various policy biases against rental market participants. The in-depth review 
of legislation (UNECE) shows privatization and housing market reforms were not 
conducted seamlessly or efficiently anywhere. Such distortions are likely to result in 
inequitable outcomes.  
   5
Figure 2: MF buildings and tenure structure, OECD versus TE 
Source: Dübel et al. (2005). 
3  Effects of housing privatization in transition on inequality  
Liberalization of markets led to rapid increases in inequality during the early years of 
transition, and despite an apparently common legacy and common circumstances of 
transition, the outcomes appear to show great variations across countries.3 Clearly, 
housing privatization was part of the broad reform packages everywhere and deeply 
affected their distributional outcomes (Flemming and Micklewright 1999). But how it 
affected inequality is much less clear—according to one view it was an equalizing 
factor, according to others it might have led to real or spurious increases in inequality.  
3.1  Stylized facts on housing ownership under socialism: implication for inequality 
in transition 
Let us start with a simplistic model presenting some stylized facts. Countries in 
transition have a common legacy of suppressed inequality. This was also true for the 
housing conditions. Typically a household in a planned economy would reside in a 
small publicly owned unit (by state or enterprise), pay (subsidized) rent which did not 
reflected any economic value, and enjoyed protection and security of tenure that would 
make it similar to extended user rights (Alexeev and Gaddy 1993). As most households 
had similar housing conditions at the start of market reforms and their tenants rights in 
                                                 
3 Commander et al. (1999). For the most recent review of empirical evidence on inequality in all 
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OECD TE  6
fact gave them a lot of control over their units, privatization by transferring the 
ownership titles to the tenants had little effect on the distribution of economic wealth as 
an outcome, but in the process it might have created a spurious hike in inequality.4  
 
Let us assume that there are only four households in an economy. They occupy identical 
public housing units worth $10,000 (regardless of age). Since they are not part of 
private assets holdings, initially inequality is zero. Let us assume that the housing 
privatization in this economy gradually (over four years) gives property rights to the 
occupants at constant rate of one household per year. At the end of the exercise all 
housing is in private hands, and since it is all identical inequality will be zero again, but 
in the process spurious wealth inequality will be generated reaching a maximum in the 
second year of the programme (Gini of 0.167).  
 
Similar dynamics can be inferred for housing as a component of current consumption 
(and income). Originally, all households have to pay equal amount as rent to the state 
and if we look at their expenditures the inequality between these identical households is 
zero. As tenants who decide to privatize no longer have to pay the rent, spurious 
inequality emerges. This bias may be further worsened by the fact that the state may 
wish to decide to charge owners higher utility payments compared to those who remain 
in public housing (privatization for free serves as a screening device to identify those 
who are able to afford payments reflecting full cost recovery). If imputed rents for the 
privatized housing will be included into the measure of current consumption, but actual 
rents will be used for public housing (typical statistical practice), inequality measures 
will be upward biased. This simple example shows that measuring inequality in wealth 
and current consumption/income levels requires careful examination. It has to rely on 
either exclusion of all rents from the measured consumption data5 as the second best 
solution, or on comprehensive imputation of rents for proper measurement of income 
inequality and housing values to reflect user rights in measuring wealth inequality.  
 
Most of the literature on inequality in transition reveals that accounting for distribution 
of housing has an equalizing effect and housing privatization is equity enhancing. An 
example of such careful analysis by Milanovic (1990) of the pre-transition situation in a 
number of economies in East Europe shows overall egalitarian pattern of distribution for 
housing wealth with no noticeable effects on the inequality levels.6 Only a handful of 
studies directly address the issues of equity aspects of housing privatization or 
distributional effects of housing sector reform for Commonwealth of Independent States 
                                                 
4 This is of course an oversimplification, given deviations from the ‘standard’ in all countries discussed 
above.  
5 An approach followed by World Bank (2005a) and by Mitra and Yemtsov (2006). 
6 This needs to be qualified as very approximate given underdeveloped housing markets in these 
countries and very arbitrary valuations of wealth.    7
(CIS). Perhaps the most well known example is a study by Buckley and Gurenko 
(1997). Using RLMS data and estimating imputed rent they report that the inequality in 
the total consumption was significantly lower in Russia in 1993 than measured by 
reported expenditures alone: the Gini index falls from an apparent 0.417 to an actual 
0.354 when proper accounting is made for imputed rents (but other components were 
not carefully checked). In a more recent and comprehensive attempt by Tesliuc and 
Ovcharova (2007), accounting for imputed rents (and utility subsidies) reduces the 
consumption Gini from 0.29 to 0.26 (data for 2003). This line of reasoning is based on a 
number of simplifications. Most importantly, studies so far have looked at inequality in 
current consumption and income and focused on implications of both user and 
ownership rights. None has looked directly at the distribution of housing assets as 
opposed to user rights for the publicly owned housing. In reality the effects of housing 
wealth transfer could have been not as equitable as it seems. Once these factors are 
listed, serious doubts arise regarding its progressive effects of housing privatization on 
distribution.  
 
First, the distribution of housing stock has not been as equal and homogeneous under 
socialism as simplistic reasoning would assume. There was always a chunk of private 
ownership, reaching as much as 50 per cent in some Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) countries. Rural residents and dwellers in small cities typically owned their own 
homes. These groups have not participated in housing privatization and have received 
nothing from it. But they were the ones who have lost out as a result of economic 
restructuring in transition (World Bank 2005a).  
 
Second, there was a significant stratification of housing quality under socialism. It is 
well documented that socialist system favoured elites in providing significantly better 
housing, free of charge (in that respect the experience of ECA countries was not 
different from China; see Li and Zhao 2006). They typically have benefited from 
transition using their social capital, and the housing transfer provided to them dwarfs 
what the poor have received as a result of marketization of their poorly constructed 
buildings on city outskirts (see Bertaud and Renaud 1997). 
 
Third, the housing stock transferred through privatization may not be as marketable or 
may have highly unequal market valuations. Years of central planning resulted in 
construction without reference to land values producing spatial patterns of housing 
stock at odds with those that would have been produced in response to market forces. 
The well known figures based on research by Bertaud and Renaud (1997) made evident 
the stark contrast between residential density by distance from the city centre in a 
market-based economy and distorted allocation inherited from the command system. In 
the former, residential density is greatest near the city centre, where land values are 
highest, and decreases with distance. In the latter, quite the opposite is true and the 
construction of large numbers of high-rise apartment buildings on city fringes in 
successive rings mean the greatest residential density is found on the least valuable land.   8
The resulting spatial misallocation of housing creates costs for residents (who need to 
commute longer distances) and the city (which has to provide city services to remote 
locations). Additionally, housing quality varied significantly by age of construction. 
Since a large area in a city was usually developed at one time, this meant that housing 
quality varied by location. The construction of large amounts of poor quality housing in 
remote locations provides a concentration of cheap housing stock that is likely to be 
increasingly filled with the poor as better off residents move to better locations. 
 
Fourth, the housing privatization was also often partial. The apartment units have been 
privatized, but not the land under the buildings and not common areas and structures; 
privatization laws often did not clarify ownership of common areas in apartment 
buildings. Local governments were much more concerned with the ability of households 
to absorb additional current costs than with maintaining the value of housing stock. As a 
result multi-story apartment buildings largely have not been maintained (see Struyk 
1996). Leaking roofs and internal piping and energy losses from poorly insulated 
buildings are the most prevalent problems, and buildings are estimated to use two to 
three times as much heating as buildings in comparable climates in Western Europe 
(World Bank 2003). All of which suggests that a considerable part of the housing stock 
in transition countries functions inefficiently in meeting the population’s housing needs 
and its market value is significantly below a common standard.  
 
Contrasting early empirical evidence pointed to rather unequal outcomes of housing 
privatization which were disequalizing (see Guzanova 1998; and most recently Zavisca 
2005). As both views refer to empirical evidence and recognize significant limitations 
of data at hand, using most recent improved data one can look at the distribution of 
housing as an asset and its effect on current levels of wellbeing.  
3.2  Outcomes of housing privatization and inequality at the aggregate level 
Different sets of inequality data from transition countries support often conflicting 
views. A concerted effort has been made to ensure comparability for data in 
consumption inequality in a recent study by the World Bank (2005b). The data 
presented below rely on consumption as a most accurate measure of wellbeing7 and 
                                                 
7 The choice of consumption rather than income was dictated by practical considerations. Income data 
remain particularly difficult to collect in transition countries. In contrast, practice has shown that 
consumption data can be gathered with a great degree of precision. Spatial Paasche price indices were 
used all countries and quarterly CPI (IMF) indices were used to compute real values. A consistent 
approach in assigning a monetary value to in-kind components of consumption was applied. To adjust for 
differences in household composition we took the simplest approach and used the per capita scale. 
Finally, the same procedure, which conforms to methods used in other international household survey 
data depositories such as the Luxemburg Income Study, was used to clean the outlier data. As a consistent 
approach was followed across all datasets, one can be reasonably confident that differences across 
countries in the consumption measure are due to differences in the primary data and are not due to the 
method of aggregation.   9
exclude all rental costs from consumption aggregate. This helps to avoid biases due to 
housing ownership and are similar to the ‘before housing cost’ measurement of 
expenditures and incomes taken as a benchmark in inequality comparisons across 
countries (Sierminska and Garner 2002). The broad pattern on homeownership based on 
this data is evident on Figure 3.  
Figure 3: Changes in housing ownership by consumption quintiles over time 
 
Source: World Bank (2005a). 
 
Figure 3 helps to see that housing ownership in itself does not help to differentiate 
between rich and the poor, not only in transition economies but also in three 
‘benchmark’ cases used as comparison. This conclusion is supported by data from many 
countries in Latin America reported in Torche and Spilerman (2006); there, between 60 
and 90 per cent of households in the lowest decile own their dwellings and there is 
sometimes a reverse relationship between ownership and income levels, similar to what 
is observed in Moldova. 
 
Have these homogeneous ownership rates implied a more egalitarian distribution, 
especially in countries with large housing privatization programmes? Or was it a factor 
significant enough to slow down inequality increases driven by other factors? Figure 4 
tries to investigate this question by simply confronting the size of ownership transfer 
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Figure 4: Housing wealth shift and change in inequality, 1990-99 
Source: Own estimates based on World Bank (2001) and from Mitra and Yemtsov (2006).  
 
Measures of inequality used here are based on official data and do not fully reflect the 
work on the comparable ‘second best’ consumption indicator referred to above. It shows 
no apparent relationship between the size of privatization programme and changes in 
inequality in a cross-country perspective. If anything, one may see some signs of 
positive association (especially if the clear outliers of Turkmenistan and Georgia are 
removed). Every country with a shift in housing ownership of more than 30 per cent has 
an increase of over 6 percentage points in the Gini index. That positive link is contrary 
to common belief according to which privatization counteracts inequality increases. But 
as we discussed due to biases in the existing readily available welfare measures, this 
relationship may reflect a spurious correlation between (incorrectly) measured 
inequality and privatization of housing stock. 
 
Despite this apparent lack of correlation, it is obvious that housing privatization 
programmes created winners and losers depending on where people happened to be 
living at the beginning of transition. Those in well located larger units in areas with a 
sound economic basis received far more valuable assets than did residents of collapsing 
mono-industrial cities or remote and underserved suburbs. It is noteworthy that since 
most privatization programmes have not yet closed, households living in social housing 
who have the right to privatize their units should also be considered winners or losers 
since they cannot be evicted, can easily privatize and sell, and also often sublet units on 
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4  Data and features of housing privatization for Poland, Russia, and Serbia 
Given significant variations of housing privatization programmes across countries it will 
be particularly interesting to study its effects in a comparative perspective. Recent 
advances in data availability in transition economies8 has led to proliferation of studies 
on household welfare taking advantage of micro datasets from representative household 
surveys. However, so far none of the countries in the region has special surveys of 
household assets or debts, which is the case in many OECD countries.9  
 
The author is not aware of any household expenditure and income survey in the region 
in which households are asked to report the market value of their housing, let alone 
financial and other productive assets and debts. Moreover, very often the information 
collected on household belongings is so abbreviated that it is impossible to do any 
indirect estimates described below. The choice of countries for the analysis of housing 
privatization was therefore not very wide. Within a subset of countries with suitable 
surveys three were selected based on the quality and comprehensiveness of collected 
data and characteristics of their housing privatization programmes: Poland, Russia, and 
Serbia.  
4.1  Housing privatization in Poland, Russia, and Serbia 
In each of these three countries privatization programme included give-away schemes 
for tenants of public housing. The terms of such transfers differed, and even more so, 
supporting changes in housing policy and legal framework.  
 
Poland started the transtion with a significant share of housing stock in private hands, 
mostly as ownership of housing co-operatives (Markham 2003). One of the first acts of 
the new government in 1990 was to devolve ownership of public housing to the newly 
established local governments, transferring the reponsibility for housing maintenance. 
In addition state-owned land was made available for private development. There was a 
one-time title transfer at below market price and was supported by a package of reforms 
that created a proper framework for the housing sector, including rapid reform of 
utilities to achieve cost recovery, proper titling of co-operative stock, enabling 
legislation for private investors, land reform, clear delineation of property rights, and 
restitution to former owners. Social policy and affordability concerns played a 
significant role in retaining municipal housing as a sizeable fraction of the housing. The 
focus being on developing markets and transformation of co-operative ownership into 
condomuniums (Dübel et al. 2005).  
                                                 
8 Discussed in World Bank (2005a), and in Mitra and Yemtsov (2006).  
9 See the paper on the Luxembourg Wealth Survey by Jäntti and Sierminska (2006), or even in 
developing countries—see for instance the paper on India by Subramanian and Jayaraj (2006).   12
Russia pursued a policy of effectively giving away public- and entreprise-owned 
housing stock over a long period of time, while continuing large public housing 
construction. Households were given an option to privatize at a symbolic (book value) 
price and that option remained open till the adoption of the New Housing Code in 2006. 
In parallel housing stock owned by enterprises has been divested to the municipalities. 
The rental controls and utilities price policy were intended to slow down the pace of 
privatization in effect providing significant subsidies to households opting not to 
privatize. Tenancy rights remained strong (eviction is still nearly impossible). Rents 
were kept artificially low and standardized and the amount charged in principle should 
equal the maintenance fee, but owners are also expected to pay property taxes not paid 
by renters. Renters remain legally entitled to improved state-provided housing if living 
in sub-standard (e.g. overcrowded accommodations) and were reluctant to privatize 
their existing poor quality units, which would render them ineligible for a better unit 
from the municipality. At the same time the country was developing a legal framework 
to ensure housing market operations. The main impediment was controversy over the 
public ownership on land and structures/common areas in MF buildings (Struyk 1996). 
 
Serbia, while historically posessing the largest private housing stock, undertook 
privatization which was a one-time event rapidly transferring publicly owned units to 
their tenants for a symbolic price. But there was a missing legal framework, 
contradictions between different laws governing housing market, and unclear 
delineation of ownership and user rights for housing and maintenance obligations. Vast 
parts of the country (rural areas) were practically excluded from any housing reform 
(UNECE ‘Serbia and Montenegro’).  
4.2 Surveys 
This paper relies on income and expenditure surveys with sufficient housing data for 
each country.  
 
Poland: the study is based on household budget surveys (HBSs) conducted by the 
Central Statistical Office (CSO). Since 1993, the annual HBS sample contains over 
31,000 households, or about 100,000 individuals. The Polish HBS provides data on 
household income, expenditures, type of residence, housing conditions, durables, land 
area (if any), etc. Fairly detailed information is also given for each household member. 
The HBS provides information on whether the household has a particular type of 
durable, and how many items—but does not provide information on their quality 
(estimated value, date of purchase, brand name, etc.). No data on financial assets or 
debts is collected. 
 
Russia: Rosstat, official statistical agency of Russia, implemented in 2003 a multi-topic 
survey, the Sample Survey of Household Welfare and Participation in Social   13
Programmes, or NOBUS10 (for its Russian acronym). The sample is about 45,000 
households, representative for 46 out of the 89 regions of the Russian Federation. The 
survey contains unusually (compared to HBS or RLMS, other household surveys 
available for Russia) detailed information on housing conditions and household 
durables. A key unique feature of the dataset (in Russia statistics) was a hypothetical 
question asking households to estimate rent payable to privately rent their dwelling unit. 
In combination with detailed data on housing characteristics it gives an opportunity to 
correctly estimate the implicit (imputed) rent. 
 
Serbia: LSMS (Living Standards Measurement Survey) was conducted by a private 
research agency SMMRI under the contract with the social welfare ministry to 
compensate for the shortcomings of the official HBS. The survey was designed to be 
representative for six macro regions and within each region for urban and rural areas. 
The sampling procedure relied on a two-stage sampling. In total, 618 primary sampling 
units (enumeration districts) were selected for the sample. The survey was conducted 
twice, in 2002 and 2003 (on a sample of 2,500 households). The questionnaire design 
was based on the principle of combining critical elements of the LSMS model 
questionnaire (focus on the multi-dimensional aspects of living standards, focus on 
consumption measurement) with elements of the standard HBS (with expanded set of 
data on durables and productive assets). The survey has been accompanied by a unique 
(in the region) real estate survey implemented by Dragisa Bjeloglav (SMMRI).  
4.3  Valuing housing as an asset and as an element of current consumption 
To assess what actually happened to household wealth with housing privatization one 
needs more accurate estimates of estimates of the housing values. As in many Latin 
American countries (as shown by Torche and Spilerman 2006), in ECA there is no data 
collected on the value of housing possessed by households, and to derive exact 
parameters of housing wealth distribution one needs special set of assumptions, 
introduced below.  
 
Opportunity cost approach relies on the observation that housing value and the flow of 
services from housing are two sides of the same coin. If we have one of them, we can 
estimate the other. Purchase of a housing unit with common financial terms of housing 
finance (down payment, years of mortgage, real interest rate, closure cost) is an 
estimated cost of homeownership. That monthly cost (plus maintenance) is an indication 
of the rent that should be charged for the owner unit to recover the investment.  
 
Often neither of the two sides (market housing price and market rent) can be observed 
for the same unit. For imputing such missing values three methods are used: self–
                                                 
10 Data, documentation and a selection of papers based on the NOBUS data are available on line at 
http://nobus.worldbank.org.ru.    14
assessment, user costs, and extrapolation through hedonic regressions or stratification 
(Eurostat 2005). Among those, the user cost method can be applied only to derive 
macroeconomic (SNA) estimates and cannot be used at the micro level. Stratification is 
the method most frequently used in EU countries for HBS data. It consists of dividing 
housing stock into strata (by location, quality, size, etc.) and in using actual average 
market values to impute values to all units in a stratum. Hedonic regressions are often 
combined with self-assessment and following Rosen (1974) regress a set of 
characteristics of housing quality on the observed market rents or housing values (with 
subsequent extrapolation to non-renters or non-evaluated units), or on reported 
subjective assessments of such values. In the latter case predicted values by the 
regression are used to remove the outliers and carry out consistency checks with actual 
real estate market data. 
 
When the aim is to construct housing wealth estimates and no data are available in the 
survey or from external sources, imputing back from rental prices is often used. 
Empirical studies of the developed rental and housing markets consistently find a tight 
relationship between the rent and the market price for the housing unit (for an example 
of tight links between average rent and house prices in Germany’s länder see Palacin 
and Shelburne 2005). Such a relationship depends on the prevailing interest rate (and 
mortgage finance terms), and expected changes in housing prices. Often ‘home rent or 
buy cost calculators’ are used to assess opportunity costs of owning a house and allow 
derivation of a relationship specific to each time period and country. In each country, 
given differences in the available data, the analysis had to rely on different procedures.  
 
Poland: housing value was imputed based on a two-stage procedure which used actual 
market rents. At the first stage (log) current market rental charge (for market renters) 
was regressed on apartment quality measured with its amenities and access to various 
facilities, its space, type of building, location, etc. Location has been measured with the 
following variables: region (voivodship), place of residence (rural or urban, plus the size 
of the city), and rate of unemployment in the region (as a proxy of the general quality of 
the neighbourhood). While overall all signs were correct, the fit (R
2 is only 0.08) is low 
(see Toplinska and Kuhl 2003). The model was then used to predict values for non-
renters (owners) and those with social rents. For each owner-occupied dwelling imputed 
rent has been estimated using regression parameters and characteristics of the dwellings. 
Owners’ imputed rent was recalculated into the housing price for each household using 
the mortgage calculator (which was reduced to Housing Asset=Monthly Rent * 750-
166.67). The value thus obtained has been compared to data from real estate agencies to 
ascertain broad accuracy.  
 
Russia: imputing housing values had to use a different information base than in Poland 
given a much smaller market rental segment. Market-based transactions were a minority 
in Russia in 2003—less than 5 per cent of the tenants rented their dwellings from other 
private agents (households or companies). Of these, only half have reported the monthly   15
rent they pay; a third of households nationwide rented their dwellings from government 
or municipal authorities and were paying ‘social rent’, a controlled price set well below 
the private market price.  
 
The procedure to estimate housing values started with the imputation of rents and had to 
rely on reported subjective (implicit) rent by owners. In the NOBUS survey, the 
households who own their dwellings are asked to estimate the rental value of their 
dwelling – the amount of money they would have to pay if they would have to rent such 
a dwelling from a third party. These implicit rents were in the same range as the private 
market range (see Tesliuc and Ovcharova 2007 for details), and substantially above the 
‘social rents’ paid by the tenants of government or municipal housing. Tesliuc and 
Ovcharova used a hedonic rent regression in which rents reported by a subset of the 
population (market-based or implicit rents) were regressed on a set of housing 
characteristics (number of rooms and measures of dwelling quality such as type of roof, 
floors, construction material of walls, type of sanitation, etc.), as well as regional and 
area dummies. The model has a reasonable fit, explaining 66 per cent of the variation in 
rents. Moreover, the coefficients of the model have the expected sign. Next, the 
parameter estimates obtained from this model were used to predict rental values for all 
households, under the assumption that the rents ‘estimated’ by homeowners included a 
non-systematic error term that the model eliminated. The final step was identical to 
Poland and consisted of converting the flow of rents into at estimation of housing asset 
value.  
 
Serbia is the only country where the housing wealth calculation is direct. Assessment of 
home prices was conducted as part of the household survey. Assessment of each 
housing value was based on the data which was provided by the real estate agencies and 
housing transactions in 19 regions of the country where the survey has been conducted 
in order to get an average market value by type of house/apartment (taking into account 
the space and other characteristics of the real estate, nine different types of dwellings). 
The method used mimics almost exactly stratification approach. Based on housing 
values and assumed deprecation rates and cost of capital, the imputed rent was 
computed as annual flow of services for owner-occupied dwellings. Interestingly 
enough, the estimated owner-occupied rent was similar in both its median and mean 
values and shape to actual rents paid by those renting their dwellings.  
 
There are a number of issues related to these approaches. Underdeveloped housing 
markets typically constrain the use of survey-generated data. Households may not be 
aware of the actual housing values of their dwellings or market rents. However, when 
such comparisons are made self-reported data are found to be accurate (Bucks and 
Pence 2005). There are also issues of self-selection when estimates from renters are 
used to impute values for owners. With the credit boom and increases in mortgage 
finances across the region, the assumption about zero debt made implicitly in all these 
calculations will soon become invalid and will require collection of household level data   16
on net worth (or data on debt). Finally the questionnaires help to identify (with more or 
less precision) whether the respondent resides in a housing unit that was privatized, but 
given the time elapsed since privatization started and does not capture movers who 
purchased their properties by selling a privatized unit. But given very low residential 
mobility rates (less than 2 per cent in Russia; World Bank 2005a and 2005b), this 
introduces only a minimal bias. 
5  Outcomes of housing privatization in three countries: results for Poland, 
Russia, and Serbia 
To better understand the effects of privatization on the distribution of wealth and 
inequality we need to turn to survey data. Table 1 provides a basic introduction to the 
scale of privatization as picked up by household surveys and basic features of housing 
stock. To trace the effects of privatization, households which reside in privatized 
dwellings are identified and measured separately. 
 
First, one can observe that the scale of housing privatization differed somewhat across 
countries, but everywhere it affected a sizeable subset of households. At this level of 
physical characteristics of housing stock one finds little inequality between homeowners 
and those who have privatized their dwellings. If anything, the ‘privatizers’ seem to 
enjoy less physical space than other households. Housing ownership rates (measured as 
percentage of population residing in housing units which belong to them) differ across 
countries, from over 90 per cent in Serbia to slightly over 60 per cent in Russia. 
Privatization seems to be sizeable, but far less than universal. Even in Russia where 
almost a third of the population directly benefited from privatization, the privatized 
housing represent only about a half of all housing stock. 
 
Table 1: Poland, Russia, and Serbia: indicators of housing space for private owners, 
dwellers in privatized units and the entire population  















  share, %  100.00 18.70 100.00 29.73 100.00  17.84 
Homeowners 
  to all, %  78.37  100.00 61.49 100.00 90.80  100.00 
Average 
  housing 
  space, m
2  69.7 53.3 36.8 32.9 73.1  70.3 
Gini index for 
  average space  0.257  0.140 0.224 0.188 0.259  0.231 
Note: H = housing units, all data are population weighted. 
Sources: Serbia, own estimates based on LSMS 2003; Russia, own estimates using NOBUS; Poland, own 
estimates based on HBS 2001 data.   17
Ownership conditions reported by the respondents are also quite informative. Only in 
Poland are mortgages reported by a sizeable fraction of households (4 per cent), and 
mortgage use rates are not statistically different from zero in Russia and Serbia. This is 
confirmed by the banking statistics on outstanding mortgages to households reported by 
Palacin and Shelburne—in Poland at the end of 2001 they amounted to only 1.8 per cent 
of GDP; in Russia the earliest data for 2004 show only 0.4 per cent of GDP. Serbia by 
2003 had no sizeable lending to households for housing finance. This information 
allows one to focus directly on housing value without worrying too much about 
liabilities while estimating household wealth in transition economies. 
 
Table 2 presents one step further. Using results of housing assets valuation described in 
the previous section, it looks at their distribution among homeowners. Focusing first on 
basic descriptive statistics we see that the average price of housing is similar in Serbia 
and Poland (around €25,000) and was much less in Russia in 2003 (around €9,000). 
These values are estimates (except for Serbia where they come from real estate 
valuations) but seem to be in line with what is reported by real estate agents in Poland 
and Russia. Palacin and Shelburne report average prices of around $370/m
2 in Poland 
(2001), and $455/m
2 in Russia (2003). Multiplying by the average size of the unit and 
exchange rate the values are similar to the estimates reported in Table 2 (for Russia 
2003: $455*35  m
2/1.15$/€  ~  €13,000); Poland 2001: $370*60  m
2/0.9$/€  ~  €24,000). 
This broad matching is important to validate the indirect estimate for these two 
countries. The estimate for Serbia is three times higher than the national account figure 
for imputed rents which relies on user cost method, highlighting the weaknesses of 
national accounting practices adopted in transition economies (Kovac and Radisavljevic 
2006).  
 
The distribution of housing wealth is interesting (and reported for the first time 
according to my knowledge). There is a sizeable inequality in housing values between 
the top (households holding the most valuable 20 per cent of housing stock) and bottom 
quintiles: 10 times difference in Russia, 12 times in Serbia and 3.5 times in Poland. 
Serbia appears as the country with highest housing wealth inequality according to the 
Gini index. Note that in Serbia housing values used are closer than anywhere else to 
actual market valuations of properties and thus are accurate. In Poland inequality is the 
lowest but also the assignment of housing values to households is the least accurate.  
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Table 2: Poland, Russia, and Serbia: housing wealth for homeowners and % privatized, by quintiles of housing wealth 





average €  % privatized 




average €  % privatized 




average €  % privatized 
€ HV for 
privatized 
1
st (lowest) 13,394  29.6  13,989  1,884 1.0  2,082  5,305  0.0  0 
2
nd 18,920  38.7  18,989  3,696  5.1 4,244  9,936 2.9 12,604 
3
rd 23,106  36.3  23,045  7,171  65.2 7,446  18,477 14.9 19,676 
4
th  28,405 26.2 28,120  12,379 86.9 12,467  31,165 30.3 32,517 
5
th  (highest)  44,397 8.0 37,890  19,484 92.5  19,378  62,770  54.3  59,557 
               
Average, €  25,644  27.8  21,800  8,921 50.1  13,503  25,507  20.5  44,423 
Gini,  HV  0.239  0.162  0.410   0.227  0.454    0.265 
Gini,  HW*  0.402  0.162  0.631   0.227  0.504    0.265 
Notes: weighted by households, non-owners excluded from calculations, average exchange rate for the surveys period used; in all countries except Serbia housing wealth is 
estimated based on imputed rent, procedure is described in Section 5. HV = housing values for owner-occupied units. HW is housing wealth for all households, including  zero 
for all non-owners. *Calculation includes zero value for non-homeowners  
Sources: Serbia, own estimates based on LSMS 2003. Russia, own estimates using NOBUS 2003 based on imputed rent data by Tesliuc and Ovcharova (2007). Poland, own 
estimates based on HBS 2001 data with rents imputed by Topinska and Kuhl (2005). 
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Inequality in housing values for Russia and Serbia (Gini ~0.4) seems similar to what is 
measured in OECD (for the USA, UK, and Israel, as reported by Sierminska and Garner 
2002), and in line with the less unequal Latin American countries (0.60 for Chile, 0.56 
for Uruguay, but 0.70 for Mexico and 0.85 for Bolivia—see Torche and Spilerman 
2006). Poland stands out as having lowest inequality in housing wealth overall and 
between homeowners. This again is in line with the data from real estate agencies. As 
reported by Palacin and Shelburne (2005) in Russia prices per square meter ranged 
more widely: US$2,000 for Moscow city centre versus US$160 for Magadan. In Poland 
the variation was €1,600/m
2 for Warsaw city centre versus €260/m
2 in a secondary city. 
 
Turning to the incidence of privatization across housing wealth distribution, one finds 
striking differences across countries. In Poland privatized stock is more or less evenly 
spread across the spectrum of lower and middle values. In Russia and Serbia low-value 
properties are virtually absent from the privatization (or more correctly put, prices of 
housing unit which fell into private hands outside privatization are below those of 
privatized units), and instead middle and especially top-value properties are 
overrepresented. Was it a self-selection, or simply privatization affected mostly areas 
which benefited from housing boom, occurring after (not necessarily due to) 
privatization? In Moscow, for example, housing prices increased by more than 40 per 
cent from 1999 ($700/m
2) to 2002 ($1000/m
2), and continued to climb further (to 
$3,000 at the time of writing). Both factors interplay and with the data at hand it is 
impossible to differentiate between the two.  
 
The data presented in Table 2 allow a simple experiment about the effect of housing 
privatization of wealth inequality. One might think that removing (higher value) 
privatized stock form the housing wealth distribution in Russia and Serbia, we will see 
less inequality among homeowners. But how much lower? Assume that there is no 
privatization, but all housing values remain the same (which is hardly realistic, but 
illustrative), for Russia then the Gini among homeowners would fall only marginally 
from 0.41 to 0.39 (but the average value of housing unit will be halved). For Serbia 
there would be a rather counter-intuitive increase from 0.454 to 0.461 (reducing by a 
quarter the price of an average housing unit). And also for Poland there would be an 
increase from 0.239 to 0.253 (with an increase in the average price). 
 
Thus, despite clear over-representation of more valuable properties among privatizers in 
Russia and Serbia and under-representation in Poland, the effects of privatization on 
measured wealth inequality are not self-evident and require further investigation. To see 
even clearer the effects of privatization on equity, one can decompose inequality in 
housing wealth in accounting sense into the contribution of inequality ‘between’ groups 
and inequality ‘within’ groups using the Theil entropy measure of inequality 
(Bourguignon 1979; Shorrocks 1980). Let the population be divided into m mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive subgroups. Let the population share of the j
th group in the   20
population be given by wj, and the consumption share by vj. For the Theil  entropy 




where E(1)j is the Theil entropy measure calculated for all individuals in subgroup j. 
The first summation is a weighted average (using consumption shares as weights) of the 
entropy measures calculated for the subgroups. Hence, this first term gives the 
component of overall inequality that is due to inequality within subgroups. The second 
summation is the entropy measure calculated on mean consumption of each subgroup 
(and weighting each subgroup by its population share). Hence, this second term gives 
the component of inequality that is due to between group differences. Table 3 reports 
results. 
Table 3: Inequality in housing wealth and decomposition: non-privatized versus 
dwellers residing in privatized units 



















All  homeowners  0.099  100.0 0.277 100.0 0.344 100.0 
  Homeowners,  
  non-privatized  0.109  85.7  0.289  26.6  0.373  71.1 
  Homeowners, 
  privatized  0.043  9.9  0.081  21.8  0.114  11.4 
Between  groups    4.4   51.6  17.5 
Notes: weighted by households; non-owners excluded from calculations 
Sources: see Table 2. 
 
 
The significance of data presented on Table 3 is that each country in the study has its 
unique configuration of inequality decomposition. In Serbia, the country with highest 
inequality in housing wealth, privatization added about one-quarter to (already high) 
inequality. In Russia, differences in values between privatized units and other properties 
combined with the significant scale of privatization made it the largest contributing 
factor of housing wealth inequality. In Poland limited scope of privatization, its pro-
middle class and pro-poor distributional pattern, and the relatively small size of 
privatization, resulted in minimum impact. The inequality in the distribution of housing 
asset in transition economies varies between these three countries depending on two 
factors: the size of the privatized stock and the policies that countries put in place to 
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Table 4: Consumption per capita, housing assets, share of homeowners and ‘privatizers’ by quintiles of consumption   
Consumption quintiles  CPC, monthly €*  Housing wealth**, €  % homeowners***  House value for owners, €  % privatizers*** 




st (poorest)  60  18,339  72.4  25,320  8.2  21,296 
2
nd 91 20,766  77.6  26,757  12.5  21,807 
3
rd 120  22,117  79.9  27,666  17.8  22,544 
4
th 157  21,981  80.1  27,456  23.3  22,460 
5
th (richest)  258  23,373  81.8  28,565  32.0  23,458 
Average, €  137  21,315  78.4  27,197  18.8  22,627 
Gini,  CPC  0.307        
Russia 
1
st (poorest)  25  3,882  55.7  6,973  18.6  13,916 
2
nd 43 4,874  61.2  7,970  25.9  13,240 
3
rd 58 5,500  62.3  8,829  30.4  13,332 
4
th 76 6,310  63.1  10,001  33.3  14,205 
5
th (richest)  125  7,281  65.2  11,158  40.5  14,275 
Average, €  65  5,569  61.5  9,057  29.7  13,841 
Gini,  CPC  0.304        
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Serbia 
1
st (poorest)  55  16,307  91.0  17,918  9.7  43,198 
2
nd  85  21,872  90.6 24,139  14.3 45,523 
3
rd  112  23,946  91.2 26,247  17.8 49,077 
4
th  146  27,582  91.5 30,134  23.0 46,218 
5
th  (richest)  241  30,516  89.7 34,039  24.5 46,557 
Average,  €  128  24,042  90.8 26,476  17.8 46,440 
Gini,  CPC  0.290       
Notes: *excluding rental costs for renters and imputed rent for owners. **zeros for renters, population weighted. CPC = consumption per capita. ***population weighted 
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Table 4 moves to the more interesting question of where the privatizers came from: the 
poor, middle, or rich classes. Linking housing wealth to the distribution of consumption 
(cleaned from rental costs and purchases of durables) Table 4 also puts data on 
homeownership in the spectrum of income distribution. All figures in Table 4 are 
population weighted and thus may differ from averages in Table 2. 
 
First, relative ranking of countries according to inequality in current consumption fits 
expectations. In Russia top to bottom quintile ratio is 5:1, in Poland it is 4:1 and in 
Serbia 4.5:1. Second, share of homeowners varies by quintiles with expected 
correlations between homeownership and level of wellbeing (with a notable exception 
of Serbia, where it is homogeneous across all quintiles). But even the poorest have 
homeownership rates which are not dramatically different from the averages—a 
situation in deep contrast to OECD countries but similar to the one reported in Latin 
America (Torche and Spilerman 2006). Third, privatization universally, in all three 
countries favoured the rich (or households favoured by the privatization fared as better 
off). Particularly in Poland, despite its overall equitable pattern of distribution of 
privatized housing wealth, this result is interesting. It also suggests that unusually high 
ownership rates for the poor in transition economies studied here have nothing to do 
with specifics of their privatization programmes.  
 
In full accordance with the evidence found in Latin America, the three countries studied 
here exhibit large variations of housing stock values across deciles even with 
homogeneous ownership rates. But this variation of housing wealth (or in the value of 
housing assets for owners) across quintiles of consumption is significantly less 
pronounced than the inequality in consumption itself or inequality in distribution of 
housing values (Table 2). Data presented in Tables 2 and 4 show that across the three 
countries there is less inequality in housing wealth among beneficiaries of privatization 
than among all homeowners. Thus, in sum, privatization transferred a relatively 
homogeneous stock to a sizeable fraction of households most of which turned out to be 
on top of the distribution. It therefore contributed to the increase of inequality. Thus, 
housing ownership was made more unequal by privatization, especially in the case of 
Russia. The resulting affects on overall inequality require change in the approach. 
Instead of treating separately housing assets and current consumption this requires 
combining them into one comprehensive measure of welfare. Indeed, ownership of 
housing generates service flows which form a part of current consumption levels. There 
is therefore a direct link through imputed rents.  
 
Imputing rents also helps to put privatization into a broader context of housing 
ownership forms. As mentioned before, households residing in ‘socially provided’ 
housing continue to enjoy significant security of tenure and have in fact user rights that 
should be properly accounted for. So far in the analysis they were treated as non-owners 
with zero housing wealth. If one takes into consideration their imputed rent one can see 
whether (more unequal) housing ownership affected the inequality in living standards.   24
To assess the effect of housing ownership on the overall levels of inequality it is 
important to integrate other durable assets in the analysis. All consumption expenditures 
on durable items are excluded from the consumption aggregate. Instead rental value of 
consumer durables is used. It is estimated by the cost of owning a durable good, which 
consists of two parts: 
(i)  depreciation: the drop in value of the good during the course of the year; 
(ii)  (forgone) real interest: the interest one could have earned if one had invested 
the money in a financial asset instead of a consumer good or the interest one 
has to pay on a loan taken out to finance the consumer good. 
 
The exact procedure differed across countries. In Serbia again the extensive set of 
information collected by the LSMS allowed very precise estimates of service flows 
from durables. In Poland, it was based on rather arbitrary assumptions and relied only 
on ownership data. Russia falls in between.  
 
Bringing together imputed and actual rents, flow of services from durables and 
consumption one can compensate for missing data on the value of physical assets in the 
available surveys and examine the joint distribution of wealth and current consumption. 
Following Shorrocks (1982) the contribution of each component k is presented as the 
product of its concentration coefficient and share in total consumption; 
*
k G , the 





where yk,i is component k of the consumption of household i, mean total consumption is 
denoted by μ, and ri  is household’s i rank in the ranking of total consumption. It is 
different then from component ‘own Gini’ which shows the inequality in its own 






Table 5 presents results for three countries and for three components of consumption:  








































Table 5: Decomposition results for inequality in consumption  
Components of consumption 
Average monthly 






All consumption per capita 151.91  100  0.291  1.000  100 
of which           
Imputed and act rents per capita 10.49  7  0.317 0.204  5 
Imputed flow form durables per capita  9.00  6  0.422  0.312  6 
All other components of consumption 132.42  87  0.297  0.296  89 
Russia 
All consumption per capita 83.52  100  0.282  1.000  100 
Of which           
Imputed and act  rents per capita 16.21  19  0.449  0.264  18 
Imputed flow form durables per capita  1.96  2  0.526  0.288  2 
All other components of consumption 65.36  78  0.304  0.286  79 
Serbia 
All consumption per capita 165.43  100  0.292  1.000  100 
Of which           
Imputed and act  rents per capita 34.56  21  0.498  0.359  26 
Imputed flow form durables per capita  3.23  2  0.635  0.396  3 
All other components of consumption 127.64  77  0.290  0.271  72 
Source: See Table 2. 
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Data presented in Table 5 show clearly that the distribution of housing assets has a 
significant impact on consumption levels. Poland looks like an outlier with housing 
rents or flow of services accounting for only 7 per cent of consumption, but since these 
figures are related to plausible estimates of housing values they should not be too out of 
line. In Serbia and Russia (excluding all utilities) accounts for 20 per cent of total 
consumption. Household ownership of durables plays a less significant role as a factor 
of current consumption levels and hence represent a weaker driver of inequality.  
 
Ginis for housing rent show that the underlying distribution of ownership and use rights 
is more unequal than the apparent distribution of consumption. This is in particular the 
case for Serbia (Gini for rent 0.498) and Russia. But generally even concentration of 
housing values across consumption deciles makes it a weak contributing factor of 
inequality. Concentration coefficients for imputed rents in Poland and Russia fall below 
the overall Gini, only in Serbia is it noticeably above (0.359 versus 0.292).  
 
Thus housing in fact produces overall equalizing effect on distribution in Serbia and 
Russia, but the size of this effect is small. In Poland, the Gini moves from before rent to 
after rent with imputations from 0.297 to 0.291; in Russia from 0.304 to 0.282. In Serbia 
the effect is slightly disequalizing, the Gini moves with inclusion of rents from 0.290 to 
0.292. Note that it is Serbia where privatization had the weakest effect on the 
distribution of housing, only exacerbating pre-existing inequalities. Nowhere the size of 
effect is near the scale measured by Buckley and Gurenko (1997) for 1993 (due to 
imputations for user rights and own housing the Gini consumption dropped from 0.41 to 
0.35 in Russia).  
6 Discussion  and  implications 
Based on the analysis presented in the previous section, the role of housing privatization 
as a driver of inequality if wealth and in consumption has become clearer. While scale 
and even the direction of effects from housing privatization differs across countries 
studied in this paper, nowhere does it form a major factor. Given its overall 
disequalizing effect on the distribution of housing wealth privatization weakened the 
‘progressive’ (in distributional accounting sense) impact of the legacy of uniform 
housing on inequality. As a result the overall distribution in early 2002 was less 
distorted by the factor of (non-market) housing allocation than it was in the early 1990s 
as reported by Buckley and Gurenko (1997) and Milanovic (1990). But it was not a 
major pro-poor force, as it is sometimes portrayed. Even more, given a relatively short 
time span the distribution of housing wealth in favour of the better off induced by 
privatization in some countries (in our study, Serbia and Russia), the regressive effects 
are not negligible.  
 
One can speculate that by moving high-value housing to the market privatization 
contributed perhaps to developing market depth and thus to greater liquidity of housing   27
and spendability of this asset. It therefore could have had positive effects on the wealth 
of the poorly endowed as well. But since no causation can be established, it is sufficient 
to note that privatization definitely affected wellbeing of a large group of people in a 
similar way but its effects on the wealth inequality differed dramatically across 
countries and privatization strategies pursued. 
 
The results obtained through the analysis of housing values in micro datasets can help to 
gauge the parameters of the overall distribution of wealth in transition economies. Very 
little is known about the structure of wealth holdings. The accounting methods based on 
‘book values’ produce figures which fail to account for inflation or changes in economic 
valuation of assets. Lack of micro data seriously hampers the study of wealth 
distribution. The scale of privatization can be more accurately measured based on 
estimates in this paper.  
 
Poland transferred the least ownership through privatization: only 16 per cent of total 
national housing stock value. But it represents as much as €53 billion in 2001 prices. 
Using information from the World Bank World Indicators analyzed in Davies and 
Shorrocks (2005), one can estimate overall wealth holdings in the following simple 
way: 
 
— financial assets = €77.8 billion 
— liabilities = €18.1 billion 
— housing assets* = €335.9 billion 
— durables* = €11.2 billion 
*estimated in this paper. 
 
Russia privatized 44 per cent of its housing stock by value. Tenants who privatized their 
dwellings now constitute about half of all homeowners. Housing privatization had a 
large effect on wealth holding. Estimates of housing wealth presented in this paper 
contribute to the study of household balance sheets using also data from Rosstat (2003): 
 
housing, all stock        €574.36 billion* 
housing, in private hands       €315.64 billion* 
  of which privatized         €234.84 billion* 
durables      €107.82  billion 
 
financial assets  
HH term deposits        €29.90 billion 
saving deposits          €52.39 billion 
cash holdings (inc. hard currency)   €12.14  billion 
 
actual final consumption of HH    €220.79 billion 
GDP       €379.58  billion   28
Memo: 
housing stock (official balance value)   €199.59 billion 
all productive assets(official balance value)  €539.12 billion 
incomes from property (SNA)     €19.84 billion 
 
Serbia has the least developed data on wealth among the three countries studied, but 
using unusually detailed LSMS data one can compensate for the shortcomings of 
official statistics and get some idea of their relative importance in the household balance 
sheet for 2003: 
 
housing       €65.775  billion* 
  of which privatized        €20.216 billion* 
all agric. HH assets (including land)    €9.691 billion* 
durables       €4.427  billion* 
 
financial assets  
banking  deposits       €1.768  billion 
liabilities       €0.564  billion 
 
These simple estimates show that in the countries studied housing remains predominant 
for household assets. This paper has looked at the role and distribution of housing stock 
as an economic asset in a transition economy, and at its effects on the distribution of 
current consumption. In all three countries we find that inequality in the value of 
housing was much lower among those who privatized their dwellings than broadly 
among homeowners. Those who have privatized their homes seem to enjoy higher 
levels of consumption. Features of the privatization programmes have not favoured the 
poor in particular, but were based on a rather egalitarian distribution among the 
beneficiaries. As a result the inequality in the distribution of housing asset in transition 
economies varies between these countries depending on two factors: the size of the 
privatized stock and the policies that countries put in place to promote homeownership. 
Poland seems to be achieving the best outcomes in terms of housing inequality even 
though its privatization programme is much smaller than that of Russia. This shows the 
importance of broad housing market reforms to achieve better access to housing. 
 
Some observed irregularities suggest that Russia in particular needs to implement its 
housing reform to address some of the emerging issues. Despite its seemingly 
egalitarian legacy the country appears to have one of the most unequally distributed 
housing stock and have low-value housing. The recently adopted housing code ended 
the open-ended right to privatize. In Serbia with its deeply unequal distribution of 
housing the problem seems to lie elsewhere—an insufficient supply of better quality 
housing due to a poor financial framework and legal problems in setting up an efficient 
housing market. Practically missing rental housing stock is a sign of these problems.   29
The result is that a majority of the housing stock in Serbia is not managed and 
maintained as though it were privately owned.  
 
Despite a common belief and some earlier evidence the paper does not find significant 
effects of housing on consumption inequality. When owner-occupied housing rents and 
durables are properly accounted for, the effects of housing is mildly progressive in 
Russia and Poland and regressive in Serbia, but the contribution of housing to the 
inequality is not more than 1-2 percentage points of Gini. This is due primarily to the 
emerging closer relationship between the welfare of households, their current 
consumption, and the quality and quantity of housing. This represent a change 
compared to the situation observed in early transition when connections between 
household wealth and current consumption was weak.  
 
The paper identifies a number of gaps in the data. First, in no survey are respondents 
asked to provide a market valuation of their dwelling. Second, a proper understanding 
of housing market and mobility is impossible without collecting data on the history of 
dwelling purchase/rental. Finally the estimate of the housing net worth requires 
collection of data on mortgages and housing debts, but currently such information is not 
systematically collected. Housing finance for individual units is now rapidly developing 
in a number of transition countries and interest rate margins are falling rapidly, 
particularly in those countries where banks have linked with foreign investors who have 
played a significant role in bank restructuring. Better data are needed to manage risks 
associated with this process and equality implications require serious policy discussions.  
 
Overall the information collected through existing household surveys used in this study 
seems to provide enough data to make a first rough measurement of housing wealth 
distribution, but further progress depends on addressing the gaps. This will help to 
provide more accurate estimates of increasingly important factor of wellbeing in 
transition countries. 
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